Dialogue, indexicality and dead authors

Peirce-L thread 22 - 27 Feb. 1998


Date: Sun, 22 Feb 1998 19:17:17 -0600 (CST)
From: Joseph Ransdell 
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?


At 08:15 AM 2/22/98 -0600, Charles Pyle wrote:

> Would it make sense to say that Tom has ceased to function at the level
> of secondness, the level of brute physical being, but that he has not
> ceased to function at the level of thirdness, the level of signs?

Charles, let's shift this away from reference to Tom Anderson as exemplary
case to Charles Peirce -- or to the author in general -- which was part of
what I was wanting to work toward doing in the message to which Cathy took
objection.  

Okay, then, I think that what you say is on the right track but cannot be
correct as you state it since discourse -- semiosis -- involves all three
categories and the thirdness aspect cannot be abstracted in that way.   But
I think what you might actually be wanting to say is rather that the dead
author is no longer able to control the process in some important way, and
I think that is right and that what that might mean, in semiotical terms,
is that the dead author is no longer in position to supply indices other
than those already supplied, whereas the living author can respond to an
interpretation with "But I didn't mean THAT!"  

This does not mean that what the author says has no indexical value such
that the dead author has lost all control in that respect -- our control
via indices clearly extends past the time of utterance and thus cannot be
simply annulled by death - but only that some control has been lost, and it
could be of importance to understand just how this works since subsequent
commentators and editors may -- and probably often do -- take over
authorial functions surreptitiously as it were.  

What I have in mind is that IF it is important to recognize that the author
of something has a special right -- though not absolute and perhaps even
very limited in many cases -- to correct and thus to control
interpretation: "No, that is not what I meant!"; and if that depends
importantly on the control over the indexical function, then paying due
respect to the author entails trying to understand where their ability to
exercise that right ends, so that when it IS being indexically controlled
beyond that point someone else is, in effect, impersonating the author and
can be identified as doing such.  Now this impersonation can no doubt be
legitimate, IF it is recognized for what it is, and may even be necessary
for this purpose or that, but when it is obscured in some way then some
kind of misrepresentation is involved.  

I am not sure that talking about the secondnsss aspect only in terms of
indices is the right way to do it, by the way, given the way secondness
explicates other sign types as well, but I start off with that in order to
get it into semiotical terminology immediately.  

We have to bear in mind that, as regards discourse, indexicality begins
with utterance, which is something that happens at a time and place, but it
is present in discourse in any number of different ways, namely, wherever
some matter of fact must be taken for granted in order to proceed since it
is the appeal to a fact that grounds an index as such.  This is where the
power of control is available to the individual, I think, not at the level
of the symbol (as Humpty-Dumpty thought), nor at the level of the icon,
since likeness is ultimately just given.  What we are talking about, in
other words, are the structures of reference implicit in discourse, and the
chief difference between the dead author and the living one is, from this
point of view, that the dead author cannot produce new text which,
referring to a given text already produced, can alter the structure of
reference it already has.  

But what kind of a limitation is this, really?  The extent to which this
actually limits the significance of the text already in existence is a
matter of the interpretational practices, not simply or even primarily a
matter of the author and his or her real opportunities to say something
more -- to introduce his own brute factuality as an individual into the
process -- since that has only as much effect as the practices of
interpretation allow it to have.  It is possible that there could be
practices which annul the difference between the powers of the living and
the dead author altogether, either by treating the living author as if dead
(by canonizing and completely decontextualizing it, for example: the last
word, the definitive edition, the authoritative text, etc.) or the dead as
if living (recognizing nothing fixed or simply given and de facto settled,
putting no limitations on the role of context and thus completely
relativizing the text to a time and place): surely two unwanted extremes
marking two kinds of lunacy, I should think. That our present practices are
sane, though, seems to me questionable.   

But this is perhaps a good place to stop temporarily.  

Joe Ransdell

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell 
Dept of Philosophy 
Texas Tech University
Lubbock, Texas 79409, USA

Date Mon Feb 23 18:42:27 1998
From: Hugo Fjelsted Alroe
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?

Joseph Ransdell wrote in an interesting mail:

> I think what you might actually be wanting to say is rather that the dead
> author is no longer able to control the process in some important way, and
> I think that is right and that what that might mean, in semiotical terms,
> is that the dead author is no longer in position to supply indices other
> than those already supplied, whereas the living author can respond to an
> interpretation with "But I didn't mean THAT!"  

and more...

The issue of the dead living on in some intellectual sense, apart from the 
physical, biological and social continuance, might be placed in a more general 
context of communication, in line with Joe's mail. I remember a lively thread 
on dialogue previously on Peirce-l, and I wonder whether the death of an author 
is but an absolute end of a spectrum from personal, or open, dialogue to the 
detached and closed text. The participation of each unique partner in inquiry 
is more or less limited by the particular life, and death, of that potential 
participant. Open dialogue is an ideal never fully met; it is a possibility, 
based on and limited by actuality. Engaging in dialogue is a precious 
opportunity, something to be cherished and nourished; the door will be closed 
soon enough.

We each engage in our own 'dialogue' with the world, we each live our own 
experiental lives; and this personal experience we may share to some extent 
through dialogical interaction. The connection with the personal experience can 
only be assured through the error elimination of dialogue. In this perspective, 
the text lives, takes its meaning, from this dialogical connection with the 
personal experience.  And the text only preserves meaning to the extent that 
some dialogical connection is preserved. Our common human nature is such a 
connection in all ordinary texts; or more generally, understanding a closed text 
rests on some presumption of context, often based on common nature.

Perhaps the internet (as a dialogical community based on new technology) can be 
seen as a revival of open dialogue, or more precisely as an opening or widening 
of the ongoing dialogical inquiry. The long history of specialization of knowledge 
has brought with it a narrowing of the ongoing dialogue, dialogue taking place 
more within groups of specialists and less across the borders between. As a limited 
individual, this growth of specialized knowledge is a problem in terms of sheer 
volume. As such, this is an actual limitation on the open inquiry, a restraint on 
the possibilities of dialogue.

The open groups of discussion on the internet, and mailing lists such as this one, 
are, whether intentionally or not, opening up new possibilities of dialogue, 
removing some blocks on the road of inquiry. There are still blocks which cannot be 
moved; in an individualized culture, in an intellectual society, the death of the 
individual seems more final than would be the case in a more social culture, where 
the individuals shared more common nature. In our society, here and now, the 
intellectual context of the individual seems pretty decisive, as compared with common 
nature, and hence dialogue seems crucial to inquiry. Texts are not enough. We need 
dialogue, or substitutes of dialogue in terms of whatever context may be made 
available.

In case there is some substance in these thoughts, they do concern some issues of 
importance for the structuring of an electronic community. If not, I still feel 
priviliged to be here and reluctant to let possibilities of real dialogue get lost. 

Dialogically, from without,

Hugo

Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 16:02:23 -0600 (CST)
From: Jim L Piat
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?

Hi Hugo Alroe,

Recently you wrote that, "Texts are not enough.  We need dialogue, or
substitutes of dialogue in terms of whatever context may be made
available".

Patrick Coppock's Arisbe Cafe is one good opportunity I haven't taken
advantage of. 

Do you have any further suggestions as to how we might increase the
dialogical component of our exchanges here on the Pierce-L ?

You also mentioned that you felt privileged to be here and so do I.

Jim Piat
a clinical psychologist writing with from his home office in Atlanta, Ga.
USA
   

Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 00:19:41 -0600 (CST)
From: Joseph Ransdell 
Subject: Re: Absent Authors (A new liberation movement)

Hello, Leon!  Always good to hear your voice!  In response to me saying that: 
> . . . the dead author is no longer in position to supply indices other
> than those already supplied, whereas the living author can respond to an
> interpretation with "But I didn't mean THAT!"" 

you said:
>         Isn't this substantially what Plato complained about with respect to
> writing in I forget what dialogue? The author of a book or article is in the
> same position with respect to his reader -- whether dead or alive.

With qualifications, yes, but it depends on how you construe it.  That is,
in the Phaedrus Plato (the Platonic Socrates) is issuing a warning about
the dangers implicit in the reliance on the written word: it tempts us to
regard it as if the author is dead in the sense of being incapable of
furthering the dialogue.  
I don't think it is  paper-embodied (parchment-embodied) text vs
voice-embodied text that Plato is concerned with but with the distinction
between words that are a part of dialogue and words that are monological:
thinking -- which is essentially dialogical -- stops when monologue occurs.
 He identifies sophistic rhetoric with monological discourse. (The dialogue
begins with Phaedrus attempting to palm off a written speech by the Sophist
Lysias as something truly oral when in fact it is just a parroted
repetition of what he actually has on him in the form of the inscribed
text.  Socrates says, in effect, "Let's recognize that set piece by Lysias
for what it is, Phaedrus: your attempting to recite it from memory won't
change it from being something written down and not truly oral."  This is
the difference between Socratic and sophistic discourse, pointed out in one
way and another many times in the dialogues: the former is dialogical, the
former is monological. And when dialogue stops, thought stops.  I put this
in terms of there being no more indices, nothing "brute" that can provide
the oppositionality required for thinking to occur. 

But I think the point about the written word is not paper-embodiment as
such but the way in which paper embodiment encourages the monological
mentality--which is also, of course, the authoritarian mentality: no
questions are taken.  Things are said and that's that.  Books don't have to
be in the service of monologism but if the production of books and articles
is treated as an end in itself -- as it commonly is in academia when people
are rated on their publication achievements without regard for anything
beyond the bare fact of publication, as is quite common -- then it is.  And
there is something about words in that form that tempts us to find the mere
production of a paper text an achievement in itself. The words seem so
substantial.  You can weigh them, count pages, and make them esthetically
appealing without regard for their meaning: e.g. Mein Kampf can be bound as
beautifully as any other text.
 
But what I go ahead to point out is that it all depends on how we treat it
in interpretation, and thus the difference between the living and the dead
is up to us in this respect.  If we treat what is said as authoritative
text, definitive text, the last word, then it makes no difference what the
author might or might not be able to further contribute or what we might
fairly be able to contribute as the extended voice of the author: the
author can be as lively and as alive as you like but still be functionally
indistinguishable from the dead, and conversely, the voice of an author is
not stilled because of physical death but because of how we regard the voice.

I am trying to express the view, not endorse it -- what would an endorsment
be worth, anyway? -- but it seems to me there is something right in this
that we want to understand more about. Hugo Alroe was elaborating on this
further in a message I haven't had time to respond to yet.

Joe      

Date: Thu, 26 Feb 1998 12:33:31 -0500
From: Hugo Fjelsted Alroe 
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?

Hi, Jim!

> Patrick Coppock's Arisbe Cafe is one good opportunity I haven't 
> taken advantage of. 

I have met Patrick once or twice on the Cafe. It is different, that's for
sure, but I have not yet formed an opinion on what role it may play in form
of inquiry. Just 'getting to know each other' in a more direct (though
remote) and informal way may well have some value in itself though.

> Do you have any further suggestions as to how we might increase the
> dialogical component of our exchanges here on the Pierce-L ?

As I indicated, I speak of these issues from without, without special
knowledge. But, though not aimed at Peirce-L, I did have at least two
things in mind. One concerns the role of openness in inquiry, where both
the ability and the will to participate, to engage in dialogue, plays a
role. The other concerns how and to which degree the dialogical nature can
be preserved, the text as a medium of dialogue across the ages and beyond
the death of the author. Both have also been adressed by Joe Ransdell in
the thread Absent Authors. 

> From the brutal fact of death as an end to dialogue, I came to wonder on
how dialogue could be furthered. One aspect is the restraints imposed by
the media of dialogue; this has changed radically in recent years, both in
terms of the 'speed' of dialogue, and in terms of the possibility of large
open discussion groups. But as revolutionary as these technological
advances may seem, perhaps the will to engage in dialogue is still the more
decisive restraint to openness in inquiry.  This brings no suggestions,
only the question of the nature of inquiry which Peirce addressed so vividly. 

Popper has said somewhere that the hallmark of science (as the project of
reason) was its public nature, having two sides, openness towards critique
and a common goal. Where Popper may have had some unitary goal in mind,
like the openness itself as a rational ideal, this is not so in everyday
inquiry. I look upon this in the pragmatic sense that goals and openness
are somehow connected in inquiry. All actual inquiries are motivated by
some more or less explicit goals, and what counts as openness depends upon
those goals. 

So, if I am to suggest anything concerning the ongoing dialogical inquiry,
it is that the goal or motivating ideas of the inquiry should be attached
to, or included in the dialogue. And this is something which is not
rectified but made more important by the technological advance. By way of
its detached nature, the virtual world of electronic communication promotes
the concealing of motivating forces, there is no clue of the lives of the
persons behind, of the money or other means of power involved, of the
convictions and stances. I am not saying that all of these motivations
behind some actual inquiry are always influencing the inquiry, but in some
cases they certainly are. I am advocating the openly contextual inquiry
instead of the secretly contextual inquiry impersonating non-contextual
all-open inquiry. Within a common context, whether explicit or implicit,
the inquiry of course seems all-open.

Previously on Peirce-L, there has been some discussion of this in terms of
the value of biographical material in evaluating, or using, the ideas of
dead philosophers. One of the major points was, if I recall correctly, that
exactly the loss of dialogical force, the loss of the possibilities of
error elimination or falsifiability so to speak, limited our means of
knowing. The point was not that biographical material was unimportant, but
that we had limited means of connecting our biographical knowledge with the
inquiry undertaken by the philosopher.  In an ongoing dialogue, such issues
can be pursued, if the openness of inquiry is taken to include the
motivating forces and other context as I suggested above.

And this leads to the concern with the possibilities of preserving the
dialogical nature. I suppose these possibilities are more or less implied
by the present technological development - present technology admits the
preservation of electronic dialogue without much ado. So the focus is back
on the openness of the ongoing inquiry. This will be the basis for future
use of the texts produced today.

I don't know if you, or others, will find these thoughts of much use, Jim,
but your question did make me work :-)

Hugo

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Hugo Fjelsted Alroe 

Date: Thu, 26 Feb 1998 09:40:07
From: Joseph Ransdell 
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?

Hugo Alroe says:

> Popper has said somewhere that the hallmark of science (as the project of
> reason) was its public nature, having two sides, openness towards critique
> and a common goal. Where Popper may have had some unitary goal in mind,
> like the openness itself as a rational ideal, this is not so in everyday
> inquiry. I look upon this in the pragmatic sense that goals and openness
> are somehow connected in inquiry. All actual inquiries are motivated by
> some more or less explicit goals, and what counts as openness depends upon
> those goals. 
> 
> So, if I am to suggest anything concerning the ongoing dialogical inquiry,
> it is that the goal or motivating ideas of the inquiry should be attached
> to, or included in the dialogue. And this is something which is not
> rectified but made more important by the technological advance. By way of
> its detached nature, the virtual world of electronic communication promotes
> the concealing of motivating forces, there is no clue of the lives of the
> persons behind, of the money or other means of power involved, of the
> convictions and stances. I am not saying that all of these motivations
> behind some actual inquiry are always influencing the inquiry, but in some
> cases they certainly are. I am advocating the openly contextual inquiry
> instead of the secretly contextual inquiry impersonating non-contextual
> all-open inquiry. Within a common context, whether explicit or implicit,
> the inquiry of course seems all-open.

I agree, Hugo, that something that can fairly be called motivations needs
to be made explicit at times in order to understand what one needs to
understand in order to participate effectively in a dialogue, which does
not mean simply agreement but can include negatively critical examination
of motives.  The problem is to get clear on what sort of motivations are
pertinent and worth identifying and what are not.  Let me give an example.  

As it happens we have had a visiting philosopher here for the last few days
who is working on some ideas in connection with the idea of a person, and
she made available some work in progress along these lines.   I found it
interesting, and all very well executed from a professional perspective in
that it is highly sophisticated in terms of the formal moves and
countermoves made in the professional journals these days, but is it of any
real interest beyond that? It is reasonable to ask this because the concept
of a person enters into many important contexts in practical life (moral,
political, legal contexts), and one naturally wants to know what difference
this and that aspect of her analysis makes or might make in such respects.   

Although I didn't get a chance to question her directly on this, my guess
from some things she said is that she would not want to get specific on
that on the grounds that it is surely better to work the conception out
first as far as possible in view of whatever formal constraints there might
be before putting it into contexts of application since one wants to pin
down what is essential in the conception first in order to avoid a mere
axe-grinding account where one is actually shaping the conception according
to those uses and the intended outcome but pretending to do something
independent of the consequences of its use.

Supposing this would be the response, the question then arises as to
whether there really are some formal constraints to appeal to -- whether
there is existing "grammar" of the concept, as Peirce might say -- 
which is independent of the orthodoxy of professional opinion on the topic at 
the present time.  If not then the ulterior motives concerning what difference
it makes whether this particular analysis of the notion of personhood is
accepted becomes of the first importance in understanding and assessing the
analysis. In the case of this particular conception there is reason to
think that there may be no a priori logical grammar, strictly speaking, buy
only conventions of usage that have developed in the process of
accommodating the social uses of the conception of a person.  

John Locke's analysis of personal identity in the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding has been influential in the philosophical tradition, and the
chapter in which it occurs is one of the longest in the Essay.  Why?  I
think myself that this is because the aim of the Essay as a whole was to
provide the foundations not for natural science but for a political science
that would be a science of the essential nature of government, considered
as an explication of the idea of justice.  Whether I am right about that or
not, though, it is at least reasonably clear that there are important
consequences connected with the conception of personal identity because of
its relationship to the idea of self and of property.  Locke's concept of a
person, then, is surely to be understood at least in part by understanding
the ulterior motives in connection with his theory of government, and that
in turn can no doubt be illuminated to some extent by understanding what
sort of government he was in favor of.  Indeed, it is not clear that there
are any a priori constraints on Locke's analysis because it is not clear
that there is anything like an established logical grammar of "person" that
can set limits on what he comes up with using that terminology, though if
there is we need to know that, too, in order to understand what he was
doing.  

Thus, to advert back to the visiting professor and her analysis: there is
some reason to be sceptical about whether what she is taking to be a priori
constraints are actually based on logical grammar as distinct from the
prevailing orthodoxy of opinion in the professional literature.   Have
things changed since Locke's time in such a way that analytical constraints
now exist in connection with "person" that did not exist in the late 17th
Century?  Has it acquired a logical grammar that it lacked then or,
perhaps, possessed then? I don't know the answer to that, but the
pertinence of consequences is surely obvious  here.  But does it make any
difference whether the particular person, this particular philosopher, has
these and those long-range consequences in mind that is functioning
motivationally? My guess is that this particular philosopher has not in
fact developed her conception of personhood thus far in view of any such
motivations of her own in that respect -- she has no special interest in
feminist ideology, i.e. is not herself an ideologist, which would suggest
special motives -- but what difference does that make?  Her particular
interest in that or lack thereof doesn't affect the question of the
relevance of the consequences to assessment of the analysis. 

My own view is that if she has not thought much about those consequences
she should perhaps give that priority over the exploration of purely formal
constraints since it is much more certain that there are such consequences
than that there are such constraints, as regards this particular topic, and
that she may be mistaking the prevailing professional orthodoxy for such
constraints.  But that seems to pertain only to her rather than to the
issue itself.  

On the other hand, it is true that understanding her work like
understanding Locke's work can be facilitated or enabled by understanding
their actual motivations, but it appears to me that it is not so much what
the actual motives are as it is what the relevant motives could be, which
is really just a way of talking about what the consequences of accepting
this or that analysis might be.  A convenient way of getting at them is to
put it in terms of the person's intellectual motivations, to be sure, but
perhaps that is no more than a convenience, albeit an important one in
practice.    

Also, it is not always true, in philosophy, that the a priori constraints
or logical grammar -- the conceptual mathematics, as it were -- is so
tenuous as it is in respect to the special case of the concept of a person.
But that will have to be explored in another message. 

Best regards,

Joe Ransdell

Date: Thu, 26 Feb 1998 11:34:58 -0500
From: Jim L Piat
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?

Hugo,

Thanks for some interesting thoughts.  Openness in dialog is something
worth examining in its own right.  Does such openness have a particular
structure or identifiable characteristics?  Let's just consider an
exchanged between three (just to be sure we,ve including both the
necessary and sufficient number;).  Here's a quick sketch of some
preliminary thoughts:

1. Ulterior motives revealed            
2. Channels of communication unrestricted
3. Open to new participants
4. Content unrestricted (?)
5. Text preserved
6. Private exchanges allowed (?)
7. Democratic control of the system (?)
8. Amount of participation unrestricted or limitations applied equally
9. Only one class of membership
        
Some of the above are probably wrong and no doubt there are many other
important factors.              

I think biographical information can be extremely helpful in
understanding the meaning of a communication.  I just read an essay by
Anthony Storr  _Nietzsche and Music_ and for the first time felt I was
beginning to have a real sense of what Nietzsche was about.   

Numerous studies (although I can't cite any) on exchanges between
therapists and clients indicate that therapist's self disclosure promotes
client's self disclosure.

On a very practical level I particularly like your suggestion about
revealing one's ulterior motives (those indicating why the statement was
made that may not be evident in the content of the statement itself). 
This accomplishes two things.  First it provides an important means of
interpreting the meaning of the message.  Much of meaning is implied and
context dependent.  Perhaps the single most important context for
interpreting a message is the reason the message is being sent.  Second,
exposing one's motives underlying a message, reduces the likelihood that
the message can be used to surreptitiously control the means of
communication.  For example hogging the channels or otherwise suppressing
a point of view.  What I'm suggesting is that even in an open
communication system one can institute patterns of communication designed
not to exchange ideas but control the means of communication.  Thanks
again, 

Jim Piat

self employed 56 year old married father of four with a hobbyist interest
in language, consciousness and the ultimate nature of things.  Sounds
like one of those playboy centerfold bios -- she also likes skydiving,
horseback riding and philosophy!

Fri Feb 27 15:40:26 1998
From: Hugo Fjelsted Alroe  
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?

Jim, Joe and List,

Thanks for your response! I will only make some short comments.
Jim gave some points of structure on openness in dialogue, I find the tricky 
ones to be:

>       4. Content unrestricted (?)
>       8. Amount of participation unrestricted or limitations 
>          applied equally

This has to do with the variety of inquiry, as the internet shows so amazingly, 
and this brings us back to the motives for inquiry. There are two aspects of 
openness at play here, I think, one of content or subject and one of critique. 
I believe Joe is focusing on the latter, and rightly so, but the variety of 
motives or goals for inquiry does not only concern something which goes against 
critique, but also a fair difference of interest. Some are into molluscs, some 
into kites, some are into the languages of aborigines, some into computer games, 
some are into sustainability and some into off shore technology.

I have some difficulty stating this clearly, - how do we distinguish the two 
aspects in terms of criteria for inquiry? I can only say, that given the subject 
or direction of the inquiry, we can demand openness in terms of critique. But if 
what the inquiry is about is to be questioned, this must be an ethical or 
political question. 

This leaves the other aspect of motives or goals, which may be coined as a concern 
not with the road, but with the *end* of the road; being particularly interested 
in a specific outcome of inquiry, intentionally or not. 

We each have our own agenda, so to speak, and this is fine, this is what directs 
our participation in inquiry in the first place. The difficulty lies in 
distinguishing a legitimate restraint on openness due to ones choice of road, and 
a less desirable restraint on openness due to ones choice of destination. The 
inquiry *is* the road, short-cutting the road is not open inquiry. Picking out a 
destination is fine, this is what we do when we chose a road, but it is not inquiry, 
walking the road is something else, and this difference should be made clear.

If I were to draw any conclusion from this (gasp:-) it would be that, in terms of 
inquiry, we may make demands on each other on the way we walk, or offer our hand, 
but we cannot make demands on the road chosen by others, not in the name of inquiry. 
Thus it is clearly important to know which road is walked, while the imagined 
destination is of no importance, as Joe says, unless it affects the walking. Choose 
freely which thread to enter, but don't allow yourself or others to choose where it 
is to end. 

I don't know if this makes any sense to you, but I am unable to do better for now. 

Regards,

Hugo

> self employed 56 year old married father of four with a hobbyist interest
> in language, consciousness and the ultimate nature of things.  Sounds
> like one of those playboy centerfold bios -- she also likes skydiving,
> horseback riding and philosophy!

(what does your wife say to this, Jim? ;-) I am into consciousness as well,
though my heart is in sustainability.

Edited by Hugo Fjelsted Alroe 17.mar.98